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Background
There are several practical reasons why disputes
regarding electronic evidence are on the increase. First,
electronically stored information has become
ubiquitous. Some have estimated that upwards 95
percent of all information is now created or at least
stored electronically.2 Second, electronic evidence is
pervasive in other ways that seemingly promote more
disputes – it is more difficult to eliminate than paper
documents; has content that changes over time even
without human intervention; and includes information
that is not readily apparent to one viewing a given file
(often in the form of meta-data that provides
information regarding the storage, modification and
retrieval of the electronic file).3
Recognizing the ever-increasing importance of
electronic evidence, the Federal judiciary in the United
States recently adopted new procedural rules. These
rules are designed to anticipate problems with
electronic discovery and avoid the drawn-out disputes
that have occurred previously in many cases. Avoiding
such disputes is important because they dramatically
increase the transaction costs associated with litigating
a case; often leave not only the parties, but the court,
lacking critical evidence, thereby affecting the integrity
of the decision making process; and frequently delay
the ultimate resolution of the case. As was stated in
United Medical Supply Co., Inc. v. United States,4
‘Aside perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten
the integrity of the judicial process more than the
spoliation of evidence. Our adversarial process is
designed to tolerate human failings – erring judges
can be reversed, uncooperative counsel can be
shepherded, and recalcitrant witnesses compelled to
testify. But, when critical documents go missing,
judges and litigants alike descend into a world of ad
hocery and half measures – and our civil justice
system suffers.’
Key provisions in the U.S. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure insofar as they relate to
electronic discovery
Civil litigation in the Federal courts of the United States
is generally governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Those rules are promulgated under the
Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes the U.S. Supreme
Court to prescribe ‘general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.’5 These
rules permit discovery as to ‘any matter, not privilege,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.’6
Generally speaking, Federal courts are required to limit
all forms of discovery when the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.7
U.S. District courts have local rules or guidelines that
may impose additional duties, including duties relating
to electronic discovery.8 Many States have rules or
general orders that contains electronic discovery
provisions which parallel those of the Federal rules.9
What are some of the key provisions of these Federal
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1 This article is adapted from an outline used by
Judge Allegra to make his presentation to the
International Conference on Digital Evidence
developed by Stephen Mason and run by MIS
Training in London, June 2008.
2 See http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/
research/projects/how-much-info-2003.
3 The Sedona Principles: Best Practices,
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing
Electronic Document Production 2-3 (2nd ed. June
2007) (‘Sedona Principles’).
4 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258 (2007), 2007 WL 1952680
(Fed.Cl.).
5 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073-77.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
7 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 26(B)(2)(B).
8 Barbara J. Rothstein, Ronald J. Hedges, and
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Managing Discovery of
Electronic Information: A Pocket Guide for Judges
at 1 n.1 (2007) (‘FJC Pocket Guide’); C.R. Crowley,
‘Local Flavor: ESI Rules in Delaware, Kansas,
Maryland, and Ohio,’ Vol. 7, No. 11, Digital
Discovery & Electronic Evidence 232 (Nov. 2007).
9 For example, see Rules 16 and 26, Ariz. Rules of
Civil Procedure (eff. Jan. 1, 2008).
Rules, insofar as they relate to electronic discovery? To
begin with, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure anticipates that the court will conduct one or
more pretrial conferences to discuss the management of
the case. Rule 16(b)(1) requires the district court to
issue a scheduling order for the case. Rule 16(b)(4)
permits U.S. district courts to include in that scheduling
order ‘provisions for disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information.’ Rule 16(b)(6) further
provides that such orders may include any agreements
reached by the parties for handling the production of
privileged documents.  According to the Advisory
Committee Notes (which notes are generated by the
drafters of the rules), Rule 16 ‘is designed to alert the
court to the possible need to address the handling of
discovery of electronically stored information early in
the litigation if such discovery is expected to occur.’
These notes further indicate that the parties might
agree to various arrangements to handle privileged
materials.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
includes special provisions that govern the discovery of
electronic evidence. Rule 26(a) requires parties to
include certain information about electronically stored
information in their initial disclosures (those materials
exchanged by the parties prior to formal discovery).
Specifically, the rule provides that a party must, without
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties ‘a
copy of, or a description by category and location of, all
documents, electronically stored information, and
tangible things that are in the possession, custody, or
control of the party and that the disclosing party may
use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment.’
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides that, absent a court order,
‘[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically
stored information from sources that the party identifies
as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost.’ The producing party must, if challenged,
demonstrate that the information truly is ‘not
reasonably accessible;’ if it makes such a showing, the
requesting party may obtain the production only if it can
show ‘good cause.’ Rule 26(b)(2)(C) requires a court to
weigh the potential benefit or importance of all
requested information – including electronically stored
information – against the burden of having to produce
the information. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i) indicates that
discovery may be limited if ‘the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’ Rule
26(f) requires that, in advance of the scheduling
conference to be held under Rule 16, the parties ‘meet
and confer’ to address various issues regarding
discovery and to develop a discovery plan. Rule 26(f)(2)
indicates that while conferring, the parties may discuss
‘any issues about preserving discoverable information.’
Rule 26(f)(3)(C) indicates that the proposed discovery
plan should discuss the parties’ views on ‘any issues
about disclosure or discovery of electronically stored
information, including the form or forms in which it
should be produced.’ Rule 26(f)(3)(D) indicates that the
same plan should discuss the parties’ views on ‘any
issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material, including – if the parties agree on
a procedure to assert these claims after production –
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in
an order.’
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs the production of electronically stored
information.  Rule 34(a)(1)(A) makes clear that the
discovery provisions of the rule apply to any
‘electronically stored information – including writings,
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations
– stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation
by the responding party into a reasonably usable form.’
The Advisory Committee Notes explain that references
in all of the rules to ‘electronically stored information’
should be understood to invoke the expansive definition
employed in this rule. Rule 34(a)(1) further makes it
clear that the parties may request an opportunity to test
or sample materials sought under the discovery rules
before copying them.
Rule 34(b)(1)(C) indicates that the request for
document may ‘specify the form or forms in which
electronically stored information is to be produced.’ The
rule envisages that the requesting party may specify
different forms of products for different types of
electronically stored information. Rule 34(b)(2)(D)
indicates that the party responding to the request may
‘state an objection to a requested form for producing
electronically stored information;’ if such an objection is
lodged, the responding party ‘must state the form or
forms it intends to use.’ Rule 34(b)(2)(E) indicates that
‘[u]nless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court’:
(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept
in the usual course of business or must organize
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and label them to correspond to the categories in
the request;
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing
electronically stored information, a party must
produce it in a form or forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable
form or forms; and
(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically
stored information in more than one form.
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
involves interrogatories to parties, includes provisions
designed to parallel the electronic discovery provisions
of Rule 34.
Finally, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes the imposition of sanctions when a litigant or
an attorney fails to comply with discovery rules or
orders. Sanctions may be imposed under Rule 37(b),
upon the failure of a party to comply with an order, or
under Rule 37(d), upon a complete failure to comply
with a discovery request.10 Rule 37(e) indicates that
‘[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing
to provide electronically stored information lost as a
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an
electronic information system.’
The Advisory Committee Notes explaining Rule 37(e)
clarify that ‘[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an
information system may involve a party’s intervention to
modify or suspend certain features of that routine
operation to prevent the loss of information, if that
information is subject to a preservation obligation,’
adding that ‘a party is not permitted to exploit the
routine operation of an information system to thwart
discovery obligations by allowing that operation to
continue in order to destroy specific stored information
that it is required to preserve.’
Common pitfalls that lead to electronic
discovery disputes in the United States –
and how to avoid them
Failing initially to take proper steps to preserve
electronic information 
In the United States, the duty to preserve evidence
attaches whenever a party knows or should know that
evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.11 This
duty clearly extends to electronically stored
information.12
While the existence of this duty to preserve is
common knowledge among U.S. lawyers, litigants and
their attorneys often move too slowly to protect
documents, initially take steps that prove inadequate in
protecting documents, or fail to identify all the
documents that need to be protected. Often, this results
in the spoliation of electronic evidence, frequently as
the result of periodic in-house destruction policies that
should have been modified or suspended once litigation
was anticipated.
Nothing fans the fires of discovery disputes more than
the spoliation of documents. As stated in the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 26, ‘[f ]ailure to address
preservation issues early in the litigation increases
uncertainty and raises a risk of disputes.’ The loss or
destruction of evidence engenders distrust and can
totally destroy the potential for developing a good
working relationship with one’s opposing counsel – the
sort of relationship that is essential to managing
electronic discovery. Such conduct provides the
predicate for the court to enter a ‘document
preservation order,’ potentially leading to heavy-handed
court-supervision of the retention and storage of
electronic information.13 Spoliation also can lead the
court to impose significant sanctions under either Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the court’s
inherent authority. Such sanctions may be financial
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10 For example, see Barsoum v. NYC Housing
Authority, 202 F.R.D. 396, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(construing this Federal rule).
11 Silverstri v. General Motors Corporation, 271 F.3d
583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Kronisch v. United States,
150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998); The Pueblo of
Laguna v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 133, 135
(2004).
12 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
13 See generally, The Pueblo of Laguna v. United
States, 60 Fed. Cl. at 138-39 (noting that the prior
spoliation of evidence gravitates in favour of a
document preservation order being entered).
The loss or destruction of evidence engenders distrust and can totally
destroy the potential for developing a good working relationship with
one’s opposing counsel – the sort of relationship that is essential to
managing electronic discovery.
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(such as fines or the imposition of attorney’s fees) or
take the form of limitations on the issues and types of
evidence that may be presented at trial.14
Care must be taken lest steps intended to preserve
electronic evidence actually cause the inadvertent
destruction of electronically-stored information. A
classic example of this occurs when an attorney takes a
‘peek’ at computer that may contain critical data and, in
so doing, inadvertently reformats key meta-data (for
instance, the date last modified). 
To minimize these problems, litigants should consider
taking one or more of the following steps:
At the earliest hint of litigation, immediately contact
the client to ensure that effective steps are being
taken to preserve, in a reasonable fashion,
electronically stored information.
Thereafter, continuously verify that the steps to
protect electronically information are being properly
implemented. As noted by the Sedona Conference,
‘[d]ecisions regarding the preservation of
electronically stored information should be a team
effort, often involving counsel (both inside and
outside), information systems professionals, end-
user representatives, records and information
management personnel, and, potentially, other
individuals with knowledge of the relevant electronic
information systems and how data is used, such as
information security personnel.’15
If the case has been filed, notify opposing counsel
and the court immediately if it becomes known that
documents were destroyed before steps could be
undertaken to preserve them.
Larger organizations that are often in litigation
should have proper records and information
management policies and programs in place that not
only provide for reasonable practices regarding the
retention and destruction of electronically stored
information, but also detail the specific steps that
should be taken once litigation regarding a particular
matter is anticipated.16
In general, where destruction occurs, courts will be less
likely to penalize reasonable efforts to preserve
documents that were undertaken in good faith. This
conclusion is reinforced by Rule 37(e) of the Federal
Rules, which, as mentioned prevents courts from
sanctioning a party that undertakes certain good-faith
efforts to preserve electronically stored information.
Failing to maximize the value of the preliminary
status conference 
As noted above, Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure anticipate that many problems involving
electronic discovery will be raised and resolved at the
preliminary status conference. However, many litigants
arrive at that conference unprepared to discuss
seriously many of the issues involving the discovery of
electronically stored information. This lack of
preparation often stems from counsel’s lack of
knowledge concerning: technology, in general, and
electronically-stored information, in particular; how
various forms of electronically-stored information might
potentially relate to proof of facts in the case; key
technical attributes of their client’s electronically stored
information (for instance, format, ease of accessibility);
and key attributes of their opponent’s electronically
stored information. The use of technical consultants, as
well as legal consultants specializing in electronic
discovery, may serve to assist counsel in improving their
knowledge. At a minimum, technical support is often
required to ensure that counsel ask their clients and
opposing parties the right questions.
The disclosures made under Rule 26(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should provide baseline
information regarding the nature of an opposing party’s
computer systems, as well as the software applications
used to operate those systems. Nonetheless, Rule 26(f)
of the Federal Rules means what it says when it requires
parties to ‘meet and confer’ about electronic discovery
matters. Yet, ‘[a]ll too often, attorneys view [this]
obligation . . . as a perfunctory exercise.’17 Instead, as
described on pages 4-5 in the FJC Pocket Guide, prior to
the preliminary conference, the parties should inquire
into: whether there will be discovery of [electronically
stored information]; what information each party has in
electronic form and where that information resides;
whether the information to be discovered has been
deleted or is available only on backup tapes or legacy
systems; the anticipated schedule for production and
the format and media of that production; the difficulty
and cost of producing the information and reallocation
of costs, if appropriate; and the responsibilities of each
party to preserve [electronically stored information].
Armed with proper information, many discovery
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Fed. Cl. 257 (2007).
15 Sedona Principles at 19.
16 Sedona Principles at 10-15, 30.
17 FJC Pocket Guide at 4.
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disputes can be avoided by reaching agreement with
the opposing counsel on several key points and having
the court adopt those agreements as part of its
preliminary order. In this regard, consider developing:
a plan that specifically addresses the client’s
preservation obligations, explicitly listing what needs
to be preserved (and how) and what does not;
a phased discovery plan that focuses first on the
production of relevant data from the most accessible
sources and postpones the production of data from
the least accessible sources until it becomes clear
that data is needed;
an agreement to exchange samples of relevant data,
so that discovery requests can be developed with a
specific eye as to what might be produced. The use of
such samples, in particular, should allow both parties
to determine what they truly need and limit the
unnecessary production of meta-data; or
an agreement to employ a common litigation support
platform that both parties can use, so as to lessen
problems associated with the form of production. In
agreeing to such a platform, keep in mind the
eventual need to present evidence to the court.
If, despite good faith efforts, it proves impossible to
reach agreement on any of the above points, consider
moving the court for a carefully-tailored protective order
that addresses the discovery needs. Such an approach,
however, should be a last resort.
Failing to develop, and format properly, discovery
requests and objections
Many electronic discovery disputes find their genesis in
poorly-formatted electronic discovery requests,
overbroad objections, or both. Frequently, discovery
requests seek more data than is needed, including
metadata that is wholly unnecessary (e.g., over which
internal servers and e-mail traveled on its way to the
internet). Be aware that some e-mail systems generate
upwards of 140 items of metadata for each message. In
many instances, the requesters are unaware of what
compliance with their requests entails or will yield – this
frequently occurs when attorneys attempt to use
boilerplate definitions that sweep up all electronic mail,
databases, word processing files, and such like. In many
instances, overbroad requests yield so much
information as to render the production useless to the
requesting party. And, if a dispute arises, such
overbroad requests are rarely enforced.18
Requests involving electronically stored information
may also be overbroad if they do not adequately specify
the form of production. Rule 34(b)(2) potentially
supplies two defaults in this regard, allowing such
information to be produced in either the form ‘in which
it is ordinarily maintained’ or a form that is ‘reasonably
usable.’
Overbroad requests are often met with equally-
overbroad objections. Most U.S. courts expect that
objections to production will be made with particularity
– enough detail so that the requesting party can
reexamine whether it really needs the information and
so that the court can resolve any continuing disputes.19
Rule 26(B)(2)(B) requires the recipient of such requests
to distinguish between information that is reasonably
accessible and that which is not. Further, under Rule
34(b), if the request does not specify the form of
production or the responding party objects to the form
requested, it must identify the form or forms it intends
to use.
Both blanket requests and blanket objections invite
judicial intervention, often with the result that neither
party gets what it wants. While judicial resolution of
disputes involving overbroad requests or objections
sometimes takes the form of giving each party a bit of
what they want, courts, at other times, react to such
disputes by either completely disallowing the electronic
discovery request or completely rejecting the objection
and ordering full production. As Scheindlin J stated in
Zubulake, ‘[s]pecificity is surely the touchstone of any
good discovery request, requiring a party to frame a
request broadly enough to obtain relevant evidence, yet
narrowly enough to control costs.’20
Discovery requests and objections should not be
crafted without first knowing the computer systems
involved. Counsel should take full advantage of the test
and sampling provisions in the Federal rules, such as
Rule 34(a) and any agreements crafted thereunder to
tailor their requests and objections to the realities of
how given data is maintained.21 In particular, efforts
should be made to avoid requesting more than one
copy of the same data (e.g., the active data as well as
recovery backup tapes), unless data integrity or
PAPER: AVOIDING DISPUTES REGARDING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE
18 For which, see Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation,
320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003).
19 See Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98-99 (D. Md. 2003)
(‘[c]onclusory or factually unsupported assertions
by counsel that the discovery of electronic
materials should be denied because of burden or
expense can be expected to fail’).
20 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. at 321.
21 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001);
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33 (D.D.C. 2003);
Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sciences
Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (all
supporting the use of sampling to tailor the scope
of further discovery).
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authenticity issues are at issue. A narrowly-tailored
request is more likely to produce relevant information
and to reduce the transactional costs associated with
obtaining and organizing the materials requested. And if
a dispute does arise, the court likely will more favorably
look upon on narrowly-tailored requests and objections.
Even if the requests or objections are initially
overbroad, the parties should still seek to compromise
their positions before bringing their dispute to the
court. Indeed, Rules 37(a)(1) and 37(a)(2)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that a motion
to compel discovery ‘must include a certification that
the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without
court action.’ This requirement is often strictly
enforced.22
Failing to anticipate adequately privilege issues
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a party may obtain discovery of any matter
that: (i) ‘is not privileged’ and (ii) ‘is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party.’23 While there are as many
as a dozen privileges under U.S. law, two of the most
commonly-asserted privileges are the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine.
The attorney-client privilege, which has its roots in
Roman law, ‘protects the confidentiality of
communications between attorney and client made for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice.’24 The privilege
encourages ‘full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice.’25
In the United States, the work-product doctrine can be
traced to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947), in which the Court
rejected ‘an attempt, without purported necessity or
justification, to secure written statements, private
memoranda and personal recollections prepared or
formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of
his legal duties.’ That doctrine has now been
incorporated into Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which states that documents ‘prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial” are discoverable
only upon a showing of “substantial need’ for the
materials and ‘undue hardship’ if they are not produced.
These privileges may be waived if information is
disclosed to any opposing party, even if the production
of privileged information is inadvertent. In some
circumstances, the waiver affects not only the document
produced, but also every document involving the same
subject matter.26
Disputes often arise when electronic documents are
inadvertently produced giving rise to claims that a given
privilege has been waived. Disputes also arise when the
party seeking to assert the privilege does not provide an
accurate privilege log or makes blanket claims of
privilege that are plainly inappropriate. The enormous
costs and delays that can be associated with reviewing
documents and generating an accurate privilege log
only serve to heighten the likelihood of disputes arising.
Privilege reviews can require the producing party to
review not only the basic electronic documents, but also
the underlying metadata. Some disputes are driven by
debates over who should bear particular costs
associated with searching and providing data.27
There are various ways to minimize disputes over
privileges (or at least minimize the cost and delay
associated with such disputes). Consider entering into
an agreement that allows for the initial examination of
the requested materials without waiving any privilege or
protection – sometimes known as a ‘quick peek’
agreement. Under this arrangement, a party first
provides documents to the opposing party under the
agreement. The receiving party uses the results of its
preliminarily review of those documents to designate
the documents that it actually wishes to be produced.
The responding party then responds in the usual
course, screening only those documents that are
formally requested and asserting privileges under Rule
26(b)(5)(A). Alternatively, consider entering into a
‘clawback’ agreement that minimizes both parties
privilege risks, for which see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). As
described in the Advisory Committee Notes to the
Federal Rules, under such arrangements, the parties
agree that the production of documents ‘without an
intent to waive privilege or protection should not be a
waived so long as the responding party identifies the
documents mistakenly produced, and that the
documents should be returned under those
circumstances.’ ‘Quick peek’ and ‘clawback’ agreements
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22 For example, see Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 203
F.R.D. 239, 240 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (‘This
prerequisite is not an empty formality,’ but rather
often leads to the ‘resolution of discovery disputes
by counsel without intervention by the Court.’); 8A
Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc. § 2285
(2008).
23 In re Echostar Comm. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1300
(Fed. Cir. 2006); Vons Cos. v. United States, 51 Fed.
Cl. 1, 5 (2001).
24 Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm'n, 122
F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.1997).
25 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981); see also United States v Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
562 (1989); Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel. Nussdorf
v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 128-29 (2007).
26 In re Keeper of Records (XYZ Corp.), 348 F.2d 16, 22
(1st Cir. 2002); Evergreen Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at
128-29, 133.
27 Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, ‘Not Reasonably
Accessible Information and Allocating Discovery
Costs,’ Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 167 (2006);
see also Zubulake.
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are only a few of the sorts of agreements that might be
devised not only to avoid disputes over privileges, but
also substantially reduce the transaction costs
associated with reviewing documents for privileged
materials. These agreements can be given to the court
to be incorporated into case management orders.
Nonetheless, care must be taken in using and drafting
these agreements. Individuals and entities that are not
parties to the agreement might contend in other
litigation that the production of certain electronic
documents pursuant to such agreements had the effect
of waiving the associated privileges.28
Conclusion 
In sum, while, in the United States, some disputes
involving electronic discovery are inevitable, others are
easily avoided if the parties proceed in a reasonable
fashion, with good faith, and taking full advantage of
the recent advancements incorporated into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
© Francis M. Allegra, 2008
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